Bourdieu and the Foreign Policy of Iran

The following article will address the question of whether religion best explains the foreign policy of Iran. Foreign policy can be defined as constituting a dynamic interplay between a state's domestic and international realms (Hunter, 2011). Suggesting that domestic realities and external pressures influence state behaviour. However, Soltani et al. (2010) argues that Iranian foreign politics operates within a dual framework of Islamic and national interests. This duality can be seen as challenging the dynamic between the domestic and the international, thus leading to conclusions such as that Iranian foreign policy goals are irrational or inconsistent (Barzegar, 2010; Hunter, 2011). 

The article adopts a sociological perspective in order to investigate how religious narratives shape decision-making. In doing so, it recognises religion as a social construct comprised of both ideology and practices (Bell, 2006; Schilbrack, 2010). In order to elucidate the relationship between ideology, practice and policy, the present study employs Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of field – a competitive social space in which multiple actors vie for influence – and habitus – the ingrained habits and norms that guide behaviour within fields. This framework is then built upon to argue that, while religion is a significant component in Iranian foreign policy decision-making, it primarily functions as a narrative competing with others, most notably that of security and influence. This interpretation not only challenges interest and power-based arguments (Hinnebusch, 2002; Hunter, 2011), but also contributes a new layer of nuance to the literature by highlighting the interplay between ideology, institutional dynamics, and geopolitical imperatives. 

The article is divided into two sections. The first section will focus on the role and dynamics of decision-makers in the Islamic Republic. While the second section will analyse the broader geopolitical implications of these dynamics in the regional context. Decision-Making within the Habitus The competing foreign policy frameworks that Iran makes use of can be attributed to the country's complex relationship between its political hierarchy and its religious authority. Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iranian political hierarchy has been characterised by its religious implications. The head of state is a cleric, thus being in the position of having to bridge the gap between religion and politics (Chehabi, 1991). As H.E. Chehabi (1991p. 69) observes, in a theocracy where a cleric is the leader, religious institutions assume political authority and thus recognise God as the immediate ruler.

However, Chehabi further contends that Iran does not conform to this rigid model of theocracy, as it is characterised by an absence of a clear institutional clerical hierarchy. The assumption that can be drawn from this is that it results in ambiguity regarding the distribution of religious and political authority. To understand this dynamic further and its implications for Iran's political structure it is helpful to draw upon Pierre Bourdieu's sociological framework and his understanding of power. Frank Gadinger (2023) puts forth that power in Bourdieusian terms is understood as a form of capital that can manifest in various forms of capital, such as social, cultural, or symbolic, depending on the field in which they operate. Bourdieu's assertion that different social fields emphasise different forms of capital is particularly relevant in this context, as Frank Gadinger further elaborates on this concept, proposing that the manifestation of power originates from the replication of specific practices within state institutions. However, Deepak Nair (2024) offers a contrasting perspective, positing that power does not necessarily stem from institutions but rather from the agency of actors within the field. 

Although I do not agree with Nair, because I find Gadinger’s proposal more suiting, I would however say that the contrast brought up by Nair leads to the idea that power can be understood as relational, shaped by the interactions and practices of individuals and groups but within the boundaries of a given field. In the case of Iran, this relational understanding of power aligns with Chehabi's argument that the absence of a clearly defined clerical hierarchy results in a system where authority is not institutionalised but instead depends on the practices and capital of individual actors. In the absence of a cohesive institution amongst the clergy in Iran, the practices of religious and political authority are determined by those who possess the highest capital, namely the Supreme Leader. This dynamic can be seen in Chehabi's (1991) observation that the Iranian constitution and its decision-making processes were initially tailored for Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. Consequently, the highest capital in this field can be seen relating to the ideals and legacy of Khomeini, reinforcing the Supreme Leader's central role in shaping both political and religious authority. This argument is also advanced by Hunter (2011, p. 249), who contends that this absence of an organised hierarchy has resulted in a foreign policy that is frequently shaped more by the Supreme Leader's personal convictions and predilections than by systematic calculations of national interest.

This element of Hunter’s argument would appear to argue for religion as the primary determinant of Iranian foreign policy. However, as H.E. Chehabi's contributions (1991) demonstrate, the hierarchy among Iranian clerics is loosely defined by the extent to which religious leaders embody the religion. Viewing this from a Bourdieusian lens consequently means a habitus wherein certain practices are deemed permissible, while others are not. This suggests that religion can be perceived as a means of legitimising power and policies. Further it is imperative to note that the aforementioned structural ambiguity has the potential to facilitate internal rivalries and factional competition. This theme is identified by Hunter (2011) as being of particular relevance to Iranian decision-making processes. Therefore it can be argued that competition between moderate and radical clerical factions is a direct consequence of the loosely structured hierarchy and personalised authority. 

For instance, the forced resignation of Mohammad Javad Zarif in early March 2025, precipitated by hard-line opposition just before critical nuclear negotiations with the US, exemplifies how such rivalries influence not just personnel decisions but also the direction and consistency of foreign policy (Motamedi, 2025). The fractured nature of authority in Iran means that religious rhetoric and legitimacy are strategically deployed within ongoing power struggles. This reinforces the argument that religion serves more as a tool in the broader contest for influence. This dynamic ultimately produces the inconsistency and fragmentation observed in Iranian foreign policy. Domestic Habitus and Regional Field Beyond its borders, Iran’s foreign policy also reflects the ongoing competition between religious ideology and security interests, influencing how the state positions itself within the broader Middle East. Afshon Ostovar (2019) puts forth that Iranian foreign policy is inspired by the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the assertion that Iran and the broader Islamic world are in an existential conflict against Western interests. Which essentially means that Iran follows a revisionist motive and tries to counter western influence in the broader Middle East. However, Kayhan Barzegar (2010) points out the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the presence of the US in the Middle East crucially altered Iranian foreign policy approach and its perception of threats. To address this existential insecurity Iran relies on external allies in order to remain independent from western influence (Ostovar, 2019; Barzegar; 2010). And although it could be argued that the Iranian relationship with its allies is grounded in religious imperatives as Ostovar (2019) describes, militias like Hezbollah and the Houthis embrace the Iranian supreme leader as their own spiritual and political guide (p.180). 

This is something that Barzegar’s (2010) article reiterates as it focuses on the notion of interconnected security saying that the US perceives Iran as a threat and vice versa which means that Iran pursues a defence strategy that is primarily focused on offensive defensive or defence through military engagement strategies, stressing the point that “Iran will not continue to ensure that the region is secure at the expense of its own insecurity” (p.180). This can be seen in Ayatollah Khamenei’s rhetoric. Recent Iranian support for groups like the Houthis demonstrates how the regime strategically balances religious solidarity and geopolitical calculation to advance its regional interests. In the aftermath of the US attack on Houthi positions on March 15, 2025, President Donald Trump publicly identified Iran as the primary sponsor of the group, thereby portraying the Houthis as mere proxies of Iran (Reuters, 2025). 

In contrast, Ayatollah Khamenei's response could be seen as distinctly strategic and rhetorical. In lieu of a straightforward acknowledgement or rejection of authority over the Houthis, Khamenei opted for a nuanced reinterpretation of the prevailing discourse. He declared, “The US must know that when facing Iran, threats will never achieve anything,” and, “The US and others must know that if they commit any malicious act against the Iranian nation, they will receive a severe blow” (Tehran Times, 2025). Despite the absence of a direct attack on Iran by the United States, Khamenei interpreted and presented the attack on the Houthis as a direct threat, thereby reinforcing a posture of deterrence. Which goes hand in hand with Ostovar’s (2019) argument that militant clients must be understood as a pillar of Iranian grand strategy and an extension of its military power. 

This understanding could be further utilised to argue that it is the perceived threat environment that drives the strategic alliances between Iran and the Houthis. However, Khamenei subsequently advanced the argument further by contesting that the resistance of the Yemeni people is directed to oppose Zionism and that this is a stance that Iran supports (Tehran Times, 2025). It could be contended that this rhetorical device is employed for a number of purposes. First, by employing a rhetoric of resistance and anti-Zionism, Khamenei could be appealing to broader Islamic solidarity, thereby invoking religious ideology. Secondly, it simultaneously obscures the extent of practical Iranian involvement, positioning Iran's "allies" not as instruments of Iranian strategy but as independent actors united by a common cause. Which leads to the assertion that religion is employed as a means of legitimising Iran's regional networks. Further, by blending the language of ideologically driven resistance with concrete signals of deterrence and strategic intent, Khamenei’s response exemplifies how Iranian foreign policy does not rest solely on religious motivations, nor purely on security concerns. Rather, it illustrates the dynamic competition and interplay between these narratives. 

This supports the argument that Iran’s foreign policy is best understood as the outcome of competing imperatives. This is enforced by Bourdieu’s understanding of power and can be further used to understand the relationship between Iran and its allies. Circling back to Frank Gadinger's interpretation of Bourdieusian power which posits that power does not consist of mere domination. Instead, Gadinger argues that power emerges through practices and the institutionalisation of them. In this context Gadinger touches upon strategy and how it is understood from a Bourdieusian lens. Thus Gadinger puts forth that states employ strategy on the basis of achieving capital, mainly however focusing on symbolic capital, as it can be understood as the capital exerting the most power in terms of legitimation. This understanding helps explain the complexity of Iran's relationship with groups like the Houthis, which, as Thomas Juneau (2024) demonstrates, transcends simple proxy dynamics. Rather than exercising direct control, Iran has fostered what Juneau terms a "revisionist actors," (p. 294) where non-state actors develop their own institutions and foreign policies while remaining aligned with Iranian interests. This arrangement exemplifies how Iran deploys both religious legitimacy (symbolic capital) and material support (economic capital) to advance its regional influence. The material evidence supports this nuanced understanding. 

Fabian Hinz's (2025) analysis of Houthi military capabilities reveals that while some missiles are produced domestically in Yemen, critical components originate from Iran. This demonstrates how Iran balances direct intervention into conflicts with institutionalising its relations to its allies, using religious solidarity as a legitimising narrative while pursuing practical security objectives. As Seyed Mousavian (2020) argues, Iranian intervention is typically triggered by perceived US attempts to impose military-political dominance in neighboring states—a dynamic that exemplifies the clash between competing regional fields of power. This dynamic between religious rhetoric and security imperatives reinforces the central argument of this article: rather than being driven purely by religious ideology, Iranian foreign policy reflects a sophisticated balancing of competing narratives and interests, where religious legitimacy serves as one form of capital. Conclusion Coming back to the leading question of whether religion best explains Iran's foreign policy, this article has demonstrated that the answer lies in a nuanced interplay of competing frameworks, defined by Iranian decision-makers. 

While this article considered the argument that religion exerts influence on the formulation of Iranian foreign policy, it has come to the conclusion that religion alone does not function as the best explanation of Iranian foreign policy guidelines. Instead, the article recognised that religion functions as one of several competing narratives, alongside security imperatives, national interests, and geopolitical calculations. Drawing upon a sociological framework informed by Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of field and habitus, this article demonstrated how religious narratives are strategically employed to legitimise power and policy decisions, while concurrently being influenced by the fluid dynamics of authority and power within the Iranian political system. 

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